Systematic efforts are underway to address major flaws in the current diagnostic taxonomy of mental disorders, fostering hope that a new nosology might be based on brain biology. The National Institute of Mental Health Research Domains Criteria (RDoC) initiative aims to redefine mental illness leveraging information that spans molecular to behavioral levels of analysis. Major effort is still needed to forge multilevel conceptual and measurement models capable of representing knowledge within and across these levels. The development of such models may help refine and share complex hypotheses, and reduce the risk of replacing the current taxonomy with dimensions and/or categories that manifest little incremental biological validity. To create useful models we need to define concepts, relations among concepts, and links to supporting evidence. Some methods already enable representation of concepts and measures at the levels of behavioral and basic biological processes, but a major gap at the level of neural circuitry must be bridged to link basic biological and behavioral levels. We provide a schematic framework, using as an example the representation of selected "working memory" concepts and evidence across multiple levels of analysis as these have been described in the RDoC Workshops. This example illustrates multiple challenges and some possible solutions that may help clarify the aims of individual research projects and enable integration of diverse efforts on RDoC and related initiatives.
It might be argued that the task of the psychologist, the task of understanding behavior and reducing the vagaries of human thought to a mechanical process of cause and effect, is a more difficult one than that of any other scientist. (D. O. Hebb, 1949, p. xi) .
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Research Domains Criteria (RDoC) initiative, which targets the development of biologically based dimensions of pathology affecting mental health, has been stimulated by heightened awareness of a schism between the current taxonomy and scientifically informed models of mental illness. This article highlights several obstacles that will need to be overcome, and illustrates how tools from information sciences may help promote the design of systems for description and classification of psychological functioning that are aligned with scientific evidence.
Developing Multi-Scale Frameworks From Genome to Syndrome
The ultimate goal of RDoC and allied initiatives is the construction of rational multiscale models of mental illness capable of traversing all the levels of biological and psychological knowledge from genome to syndrome. This also has been the aspirational goal of the Center for Cognitive Phenomics (2004 Phenomics ( -2007 and the Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics (2008 Phenomics ( -2013 at UCLA (www.phenomics.ucla.edu). The impetus for these phenomics projects stemmed from earlier work suggesting that, as costs for genotyping dropped, the greatest challenges and opportunities for discovery would be found in efforts to characterize the myriad phenotypes from molecule to mind, so that these could be meaningfully related to genetic information (Freimer & Sabatti, 2003) . Researchers interested in phenomics-the systematic study of phenotypes on a genome-wide scale-recognized that advanced informatics strategies would be necessary to identify, represent, and enable manipulation of data at multiple different levels of analysis and diverse biological scales (R. M. Bilder, Sabb, Cannon, et al., 2009; Houle, Govindaraju, & Omholt, 2010) . In the UCLA Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics we adopted a 7-level hierarchy including genome, proteome, cellular systems/signaling pathways, neural systems, cognitive phenotypes, symptoms, and syndromes. RDoC has similarly articulated "units of analysis" which include Genes, Molecules, Cells, Circuits, Physiology, Behavior, and Self-Reports. A major challenge for these transdisciplinary efforts is that an individual expert may possess depth knowledge within a specific domain, but no single person may be able to grasp details across all the relevant domains of the transdisciplinary problem. To address this grand challenge requires a framework that enables domain expertise to be assembled into a coherent overarching model, and that ideally enables people from diverse disciplines to appreciate the "big picture," while domain experts can "zoom" into more specific aspects of the global problem. The overarching questions addressed in this paper include how can we define human function (and dysfunction) across these levels/units of analysis? Is it possible? If possible, would it be useful?
We believe some answers to these questions may be provided by new information science strategies. Information science uses ontologies to provide formal specifications of domains of knowledge. In brief, an ontology specifies the identities and properties of entities within a given domain, and defines the relationships among those entities. Enormous progress already has been made in developing ontologies to represent knowledge from the level of the human genome up to the level of cellular systems and signaling pathways, but we lack ontologies to describe "higher" level phenotypes (see Table 1 ). The Gene Ontology project (http://www .geneontology.org/) provides an excellent example of ontology development for genetics and some linked biological processes. This project generated consensus about the specific terminology to describe genes and gene products in terms of their cellular components, molecular functions, and other biological processes. One important feature of ontologies is that they enable representation of knowledge in a manner that facilitates fully or semiautomated queries, meta-analyses, and even the design of experiments and robotic execution of experiments and hypothesis testing (King et al., 2009) .
The National Center for Biotechnology Information already has assembled extensive knowledge resources, albeit most knowledge is at "lower levels" (see Figure 1 ). These include the well known PubMed resource, which is integrated with 66 other databases (see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/guide/all/#databases_), including Gene, Gene Expression Omnibus, Protein Database, PubChem, and others that include a great deal of additional information about gene sequences, phylogenetic information, and more. One major resource is the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP), which "was developed to archive and distribute the results of studies that have investigated the interaction of genotype and phenotype. Such studies include genome-wide association studies, medical sequencing, molecular diagnostic assays, as well as association between genotype and nonclinical traits" (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap/). There are also commercial bioinformatics knowledge bases that aim to identify biological pathways associated with genetic variants (see, e.g., Ingenuity Pathway Analysis). Overall, these resources are piecing together a puzzle that is strongly represented at the level of genotypes and ultimately will contain complete genetic sequences. The information about gene expression and proteins is expanding rapidly, and soon there will be more complete representations of other related biological processes, including cellular functions and signaling pathways.
There remain major gaps in our ability to represent existing knowledge at "higher" phenotypic levels, including the levels that involve syndromes, symptoms, and cognitive or behavioral phenotypes that are of high interest to scientists studying abnormal psychology. Only a few years ago the term "phenotype," when used by geneticists, usually referred only to the syndromal level (i.e., the distinction between a "case" and a "control"). Other phenotype data important to students of psychology (e.g., cognitive assessment data, neuroimaging data, neurophysiological data) are often referred to as endophenotypes or intermediate phenotypes. It has been hoped that these kinds of phenotypes, by virtue of being "closer to" the level of gene expression, would possess a "simpler genetic architecture" and show larger effect sizes with respect to specific genetic variants. This optimism appears to be unwarranted. For example, effect sizes for several candidate endophenotypes (performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; performance on the N-back test of working memory; and the P300 event related potential) were found to be similar to effect sizes for the diagnostic phenotype of schizophrenia, and all were small (odds ratios less than 1.5, with genetic variants accounting for less than 0.5% of phenotypic variance; Flint & Munafo, 2007) . Studies of "lower" level phenotypes in rodent models (e.g., biochemical, hematological, and immunological phenotypes) reveal that genetic variants explain only 2%-4% of variance. Even at the level of transcription there is only a moderate relation to structural genetic variation, which for example explains only 27% of transcript abundance in yeast (Brem & Kruglyak, 2005) . These data make it clear that even at the levels proximal to genetic structure, unpredictability is the rule, and it is not surprising that specific genetic variants do not usually account for more than 1% of variance in complex traits. Thus, although there are important reasons to examine these phenotypes (i.e., to test hypotheses about putative mechanisms and brain-behavior relations), emerging data raise questions about the utility of the endophenotype strategy as a way to increase the power of genetic studies.
Although many investigators make this assumption implicitly, the most widely accepted criteria (Gottesman & Gould, 2003) do not indicate that an endophenotype should mediate relations between genotype and other phenotypes. As progress in informatics Bilder et al., 2011) . At the level of these complex traits there are few strong biological models to guide ontology development, but currently available measurement models can be applied to certain data, either by fiat or by statistical approximation. For psychiatric diagnoses, we have criteria that define every diagnostic group in terms of characteristic symptoms and social-occupational dysfunction. Thus at the syndrome level we can achieve a simple operationalized mapping of symptoms onto the diagnostic concepts using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, text revision (DSM-IV-TR), or the International Classification of Disease. Of course the entire purpose of initiatives like RDoC is to test the validity of these assumptions, possibly leading to new diagnostic concepts, reassessment of their interrelations, and reformulation of relations between syndromes and symptoms. The advantage of ontologies for these goals is that it is easier to test the validity of taxonomic models that are formally defined than those that are not.
For example, imagine we aim to question the validity of the concept of schizophrenia. We can create a measurement model specifying the diagnosis as requiring the presence of "two or more" symptom domains (from the set of delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized behavior, and negative symptoms), and a decline from previously higher levels of functioning. We can then test the validity of this model against competing models by altering the criteria, changing thresholds for considering component symptoms to be "present," changing the thresholds for duration of symptoms, or other criteria. For example, in DSM-IV-TR only one symptom (rather than two) is necessary if delusions are bizarre or if hallucinations include voices commenting on the individual's behavior or if two or more voices are conversing. It has been suggested that this reflects empirically unjustified beliefs that Schneiderian "first rank symptoms" possess specificity as pathognomonic signs of schizophrenia (Nordgaard, Arnfred, Handest, & Parnas, 2008) . A formal measurement model for schizophrenia can represent the competing hypotheses (requiring one, two, or more symptoms to satisfy criteria) and determine empirically whether the change in criteria impacts other properties shared by the diagnostic group (e.g., do the resulting categories possess higher validity with respect to genetic associations or other biological processes?). Similar strategies have been applied in studies of schizophrenia that compare results under "narrow" or "broader" definitions of the schizophrenia syndrome (Xu et al., 2009) , and can be usefully extended to encompass even broader concepts that span multiple diagnostic entities including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, autism spectrum disorders, and probably others (Carroll & Owen, 2009; Moskvina et al., 2008; Pol et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2012 ; H. J. Williams et al., 2011) . Additional examples come from studies that examine whether dimensions or categories best fit observed symptom data using statistical methods such as taxometric analysis (Haslam, 2003; Haslam & Kim, 2002) or factor mixture modeling (Lubke et al., 2007; Muthén, Asparouhov, & Rebollo, 2006) .
At the level of cognitive constructs, there is a long-established tradition of using measurement models; indeed, psychometric theory was developed to help define cognitive constructs in terms of objective measurements (R. M. ). For example, structural equation models have been used to define working memory and related concepts (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001 ). Nevertheless, there are few models specifying cognitive impairments as mediating variables that explain the links of lower-level neural systems dysfunction to "higher" level symptoms or syndromal status. Although working memory dysfunction is seen as a critical cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, it is less often hypothesized to be part of a causal path mediating the relation between underlying Figure 1 (opposite). Illustrations of how the framework maps assertions, and the evidence supporting or contradicting those assertions, onto neural circuit components, tasks, and species. Panel A depicts conflicting evidence about the assertion that "working memory maintenance is impaired in schizophrenia," with some citations supporting the assertion and others not supporting the assertion. Each of the citations "has evidence about" the concept "working memory maintenance," which is one component of the complete assertion. Not shown here is representation of the assertion components "impaired in schizophrenia," which additionally demands both definition of the concept of schizophrenia, and also what it means to be "impaired" (i.e., by comparing scores on tests that measure working memory maintenance in a group with schizophrenia relative to a comparison group). Panel B shows how a single citation can support multiple assertions (e.g., the Cabeza 2000 citation supports two assertions); the assertions in this example include specification of functional neuroanatomic concepts, thus linking the functional (cognitive) concept to putative underlying biological processes at the neural circuit level. The evidence in Cabeza 2000 is further specified by "task," "species," and "kind of evidence," so that we can tell that this study used three fMRI tasks in humans (and thus could be linked to other human fMRI studies using the same tasks if this was desired. Panel C shows for another citation how experimental results can be annotated to provide additional information that may qualify the assertions (for example, Chafee 2000 results include a dissociation of the effects of prefrontal and parietal de-activations on working memory performance). Panel D shows how information about specific neurotransmitters can be conveyed in this framework. The Sawaguchi 1991 citation provides evidence specifically about D1-type dopamine receptor mediated effects, revealed by iontopheresis effects in primate prefrontal cortex during a delayed response task (note that the assertion is mapped onto the DRD1 receptor node that is embedded within the canonical PFCPyramidal node). Citations are indicated with the first author and year. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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neural system deficits and specific symptoms. Instead, studies in schizophrenia tend to emphasize the independence of working memory deficits from positive symptoms, and although a correlation with negative symptoms may be seen it is not necessarily stable and results suggest these features are not likely part of a unitary causal path (Park, Püschel, Sauter, Rentsch, & Hell, 1999) . Until clearer models are articulated, cognitive phenotypes may best be considered at the "same level" as symptoms and other behavioral observations. For example, the Cognitive Atlas project (www.cognitiveatlas.org), which also emphasizes ontologies to describe cognitive phenotypes, has adopted a five-level hierarchy that does not distinguish symptoms as being at a different "level" from cognitive phenotypes (Poldrack et al., 2011) .
The Missing Link: Circuit Frameworks to Represent Neural Systems Functions
Given that our colleagues in the basic biological sciences are rapidly developing information frameworks from the genomic level to the level of complex cellular functions, and that we already possess tools (particularly using structural equation models and related methods) to provide formal descriptions of cognitive and behavioral constructs with respect to the measures that are used to define these, what is lacking? The missing link may be at the neural systems or circuit level, which describes how groups of cells work together to achieve functional results that can be observed at the level of the organ (which in the current context could be considered the brain or a brain subsystem defined as a group of cells in a region serving some common functional role), or the entire organism.
There already has been an enormous amount of work done on neural network modeling. The seminal work of D.O. Hebb (Hebb, 1949) provided critical background for subsequent connectionist neural network models (Hopfield, 1982; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) , which, despite limitations (Edelman, 1987) , have been well developed and may be extremely useful in helping constrain models of cognitive processes (McClelland, 2009) . Other approaches to neural network modeling may overcome some of these limitations and have variable success in modeling behavior of interest to the cognitive neuroscientist or researcher of abnormal psychology (Grossberg, 1999 (Grossberg, , 2000 Grossberg & Merrill, 1992; Tononi, Sporns, & Edelman, 1992) . Some recent models include mechanistic features that facilitate combining computational modeling with biological schemata (e.g., see the Leabra framework; O'Reilly, 2001; O'Reilly, & Munakata, 2000) , and these have been applied fruitfully to both theories about working memory and specifying hypotheses about reward system function, the role of phasic DA transmission, and more (Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2010; Pauli, Hazy, & O'Reilly, 2012) .
There are multiple advantages to working with these models. First, they enable more precise specification of testable hypotheses that can be examined in behavioral experimentation. Second, they permit stronger a priori hypotheses to be applied to neuroimaging experiments, an advantage leveraged in dynamic causal modeling (Stephan et al., 2007) . These models so far, however, have been developed independently from the ontologies created to enable computational approaches over other biological knowledge at the genomic, proteomic and cellular levels. To bridge this gap the next generation of neural system or circuit models may usefully incorporate specific links to other repositories of biological knowledge so that inference (including machine inference) may be applied all the way from genome to syndrome.
Toward a Neural Circuit Description Framework
To illustrate how we might bridge the gap between computational models of neural systems and other repositories of biological knowledge, we introduce here a neural circuit description framework, which aims to foster collaboration on the specification and evaluation of complex scientific hypotheses that span multiple levels of analysis. This example presents selected concepts and evidence derived from the RDoC workshop on "working memory," and aims to show how this may help clarify the aims of individual research projects and promote integration of empirical evidence relevant to RDoC and related initiatives.
The framework represents neural circuits and related information at other levels as a network of knowledge. In this version, the framework is implemented in Protégé, a widely used ontologyauthoring software package (http://Protégé.stanford.edu). The Protégé files used in this example are available for download so that interested readers may interact directly with and modify this ontology (http://www.phenomics.ucla.edu). An advantage of these ontologies is that they can be represented as directed acyclic graphs, with the entities represented as "nodes" and the relationships between these entities represented as "edges."
Protégé provides two major types of node: "individuals" and "classes." "Individuals" are the unique examples of the entities described in the ontology at their lowest level of description (e.g., for the class article the individuals are specific publications, whereas for the class receptor the individuals are specific types of receptor, such as mGluR2). "Classes" are categories or kinds of individuals, and may be arranged hierarchically (e.g., within the class neurotransmitter there is a subclass of catecholamines that includes individuals like dopamine). Table 2 lists the major classes and subclasses, along with some representative individuals. Where possible, instantiations of individuals mimic the naming conventions of existing resources and contain hyperlinks to these resources.
Neural circuits are represented as networks of canonical neurons. These neurons are embedded within a hierarchy of brain regions that specify their neuroanatomical location. Canonical synapses represent connections between neurons. The framework specifies synapses as separate entities, even though it might be more realistic for synapses to be seen as components of neurons and relations between neurons. This design decision permitted more detailed description of synapses, allowed synapses to be grouped together into circuits, and was more feasible to implement in Protégé. Supplemental Figure 1 (online) illustrates how synapses are represented in this framework.
An important feature of this framework is inclusion of citations and details of experimental results that are critical to evaluate the validity of hypotheses. The framework was designed to enable automated meta-analysis once populated with sufficient knowledge including quantitative effect sizes (see examples of related work at www.phenowiki.org [Sabb et al., 2008; Sabb et al., 2009] and www.coggene.org [R.M. Bilder et al., 2011] ).
Edges connect nodes and each edge describes the relationship between two nodes. One may "read" a node-edge-node triplet like This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
a short sentence. Edges are called "object properties" in Protégé and may be grouped hierarchically, which permits accurate representation of, for example, an axon in a named fiber tract. The framework leverages Protégé's inference tools, which help check for logical consistency (Rector et al., 2005 ; Protégé documentation), by defining restrictions on the edges. Table 3 provides an overview of the framework's edges. The framework can be used to represent a set of assertions that together define a hypothesis. Four sample assertions were derived from the RDoC Workshop on Working Memory and focus on working memory maintenance (WMM) in schizophrenia:
(1) WMM is impaired in schizophrenia; (2) WMM requires direct pathway activation; (3) WMM requires fronto-posterior network activation; and (4) WMM requires dopamine D1 receptor (DRD1) neurotransmission.
We recognize that these assertions are underspecified, but we believe they are useful for this demonstration. We also are aware that there are varying definitions of many key terms used in these assertions, and thus have tried to use terms as these were defined in the RDoC Workshop. The four assertions are rendered graphically in Figure 1A -1D.
The first assertion-WMM is impaired in schizophrenia-is supported superficially by some evidence (Driesen et al., 2008; Lee & Park, 2006; Lencz et al., 2003) , but other evidence argues against this assertion (Gold et al., 2010; Javitt, Strous, Grochowski, Ritter, & Cowan, 1997) . If we delve into details, however, we recognize that some of this work emphasized longer delay intervals (Driesen et al., 2008) , that some examined delay effects after equating brief-delay performance between groups using manipulations on stimulus discriminability (Lencz et al., 2003; Javitt et al., 1997) , and that the conclusions of Lee & Park (2006) are based on comparisons across studies rather than manipulations within a single study (not illustrated in the figure) . By casting these different publications in a single framework, however, these discrepancies are surfaced immediately and can help prompt investigators to consider which parameters are critically important, and which are less valuable, in determining whether the evidence truly supports or contradicts a specific assertion.
To create a graph like Figure 2 demands specification of the operational definitions of each content term, and each relational term within a given assertion. Thus to assert that "working memory maintenance is impaired in schizophrenia," we must define working memory maintenance, impaired in, and schizophrenia. As This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 
Key
Figure 2. Summary view of selected neural circuit and signaling components involved in working memory maintenance (WMM). Note that the primary nodes (round-edged rectangles) are canonical neurons representing populations of cells, each specified by a combination of a region label (e.g., PFC, parietal), and cell type (Pyramidal, MSNType1, GPiPrincipal). The neural circuit includes the cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic (CSPT) direct pathway and fronto-posterior cortico-cortical pathways, and identifies the primary neurotransmitters involved and target receptors within canonical cell types. A blue background indicates a member of the fronto-parietal resonant network, a red background indicates members of the direct pathway, the purple background indicates a member of both pathways, and the dark yellow background represents dopaminergic neuron populations. Abbreviations: PFC, prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; MSN, medium spiny neuron; SNc, substantia nigra, pars compacta; SNr, substantia nigra, pars reticulata; GPi, globus pallidus, internal segment; Thal, thalamus; VTA, ventral tegmental area; DA, dopamine; NMDA, N-Methyl-D-aspartic acid; DRD1, D1-type dopamine receptor; GABA, gamma amino butyric acid. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
noted above, there is an effort to provide operational definitions of key terms describing cognitive constructs and the tests used to measure these, along with some of the major assertions about the relations among these constructs (see www.CognitiveAtlas.org; Poldrack et al., 2011) . The Cognitive Atlas provides the infrastructure not only for the operational definition of these constructs, but also for argumentation about these definitions. By enabling the community to participate in the development and refinement of these ontologies it is hoped that some consensus may emerge (or if not at least the lack of consensus will be exposed more easily, as is often the case in other crowd-sourced applications like Wikipedia). Although this small graph hardly comprises a systematic review, it aims to summarize controversy and illustrates how a systematic review could be fleshed out, and automated meta-analysis executed, by mapping additional evidence onto the framework (see Figure 1A) . By formally specifying the evidence that is claimed to support or refute a specific assertion, we are specifying which evidence we believe should be "lumped" together in meta-analysis; alternatively, we may determine two sources of evidence (e.g., two different tasks) are sufficiently different that their results should not be mated in meta-analysis (indicating that the tasks are actually different species of tasks; R.M. Bilder et al., 2011) .
The second assertion concerns the role of the direct pathway, and Figure 2 shows how this classic neural circuit is defined in the framework. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) projects to the striatum, which projects to both the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr). The SNr and GPi project to the thalamus, which projects back to the PFC (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007) .
These anatomic features, once defined, can be used to show evidence supporting an assertion (e.g., Figure 1B ). Meta-analysis of fMRI results from humans performing WMM-dependent tasks (WMM-DTs) indicates involvement of the PFC, basal ganglia (including the striatum, GPi and SNr), and thalamus (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000) . Analysis of single-unit electrophysiological recordings from primate neurons during performance of a WMMDTs show that subpopulations of the PFC (Chafee & GoldmanRakic, 2000; Fuster, 1973; G. V. Williams & Goldman-Rakic, 1995) , globus pallidus (Mushiake & Strick, 1995) , caudate striatum (Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989) , and thalamus (Fuster & Alexander, 1973) exhibit significant increases in firing activity that are specific to the WMM phase of the task, suggesting direct pathway involvement in WMM.
The framework provides a multidimensional, structured description of an article and the evidence it provides. For example, the framework represents Fuster's, 1973 publication as node PMID4196203. It is categorized as (1) an article about (2) prefrontal cortex (3) single-unit recordings during (4) a delayed response task with (5) primate subjects as an approach to investigate (6) working memory. Additionally, it is connected to the neural circuitry at the canonical prefrontal cortex pyramidal cell.
The third assertion addresses the fronto-posterior corticocortical pathways, which reciprocally connect the frontal cortex with the posterior cortex (Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Petrides & Pandya, 2002; see Figure 1C ). To simplify the circuit, we selected the connection between the PFC and the parietal cortex (PC). Meta-analysis of fMRI results in human subjects supports the involvement of PFC and PC (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005) . Temporary, reversible cryogenic lesions of PFC impair WMM-DT performance in primates, although equivalent lesions of the PC do not (Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 2000) . However, the firing activity of putative PFC WMM neurons is altered by the PC lesion condition (Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 2000) , and subsets of PC neurons exhibit WMM period-specific activity very similar to the groups found in PFC (Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Constantinidis & Steinmetz, 1996) , suggesting involvement of PC neurons with WMM. Lesion results from human subjects (Tsuchida & Fellows, 2009 ) and primates (Rushworth et al., 2003) , along with fMRI evidence (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Owen et al., 2005) , also suggest anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) involvement in WMMdependent task performance, although some authors attribute ACC activation during WMM-DTs to a reward evaluation function, rather than WMM. We include the ACC as a part of this circuit, as it is strongly interconnected with the PFC and PC (Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Petrides & Pandya, 2002) . Figure 2 summarizes the fronto-posterior corticocortical pathways and links them to the direct pathway through the PFC. Describing the fronto-posterior cortico-cortical pathways and the CSPT with the same framework makes it possible to examine how these systems may interact and contribute to WMM.
The fourth assertion addresses the involvement of the dopamine system in WMM-DT performance (Elliot et al., 1997; Mehta et al., 2000 ; Figure 1D ). The ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) are included in the circuitry to reflect dopaminergic afferents to the putative WMM neural circuitry. The Goldman-Rakic laboratory found DRD1 involvement in WMM first by showing that injection of primate PFC with a DRD1 antagonist decreases WMM-DT performance (Sawaguchi & Goldman-Rakic, 1991) and then by showing that microiontophoresis of DRD1 agonists or antagonists onto pyramidal neurons in the PFC of primates performing a WMM-DT significantly modifies the receptive field of the neuron (Williams & GoldmanRakic, 1995) . Of the neural circuits considered here, DRD1 is prevalent among the PFC, PC, ACC, and striatum of human subjects (Hurd et al., 2001) . Evidence from Moghaddam and Adams (1998) suggests that NMDA receptor (NMDA-R) function impacts working memory performance, perhaps by contributing to regulation of glutamate and dopamine concentrations in the PFC, as measured by microdialysis. Figure 2 depicts relevant neurotransmitters and receptors embedded in the CSPT direct pathway and fronto-parietal circuitry.
Advantages of Formalization in Multi-Level Modeling
As the scope of neuroscientific hypotheses has grown more complex, we need to develop new methods to represent this complexity, enable the concepts to be shared, and permit the systematic evaluation of evidence. Already the growth of neuroscience literature makes it impossible for any individual to digest newly published results within a particular domain. This problem is dramatically magnified when considering information growth over multiple levels spanning genetics, cellular function, neural systems structure and function, and cognitive and behavioral functions. Transdisciplinary research demands the definition of shared vocabularies that enable investigators with diverse expertise to communicate effectively with each other, and develop shared This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
conceptualizations of their joint problems and hypotheses. We believe the framework introduced here offers a starting point for representation of neural circuit information in a way that enables representation of assertions about neural circuits, how neural circuits relate to "higher" behavioral phenotypes, and how neural circuits relate to "lower" cellular and molecular phenotypes, thus helping bridge the current gap in knowledge representation. Further this framework links these assertions to the annotations about the evidence on which the assertions are based, and thereby can support shared knowledge aggregation. Federated data repositories are growing rapidly (e.g., NIMH genetics repository; dbGaP), future publication of research findings may demand deposits of raw data, and within two years major medical facilities across the United States will already have invested billions of dollars in electronic health records. To convert these resources from "databases" to "knowledgebases" we need tools capable of operating on the underlying data to represent, identify, extract, and visualize regularities and inconsistencies. The framework illustrated here provides an initial step in providing some high-level description rules that may facilitate future literature and data mining operations.
By formalizing the definition of key concepts and relations the framework also facilitates automated meta-analyses and systematic reviews. For example, it would be straightforward to determine the validity of the assertion "WMM is impaired in schizophrenia" by adding to evidence as illustrated in Figure 1A , and including properties for each study to represent the effect size for the group difference between patients and comparison groups. Most readers may recognize that such assertions can be readily expanded and refined to span more levels. For example, our example did not specify which aspects of schizophrenia are related to working memory impairments (many would say it is selectively "negative," "disorganization," or "deficit" symptoms that are associated with working memory impairment, whereas the "positive" symptoms are not related to working memory impairment). By operationalizing relevant properties of experiments it is further possible to examine the impact of moderating and potentially confounding variables. A similar approach can also interrogate hypotheses about whether a set of findings is shared across diagnostic boundaries, or specific to a single diagnostic category. Formalization also makes clearer when measures should not be included in meta-analysis, for example when there are differences in key measurement methods, sampling, or analysis approach. In addition, although our examples have focused on simple "one-toone" relations among entities, straightforward extensions enable representation of both one-to-many and many-to-one relations (see www.PubAtlas.org for examples). The framework presented here thus has the key properties of "evidence maps," which have been linked explicitly to systematic reviews, and seen as critical to advance evidence based medicine (Bragge et al., 2011; Callahan, Liu, Purcell, Parker, & Hetrick, 2012; Hetrick, Parker, Callahan, & Purcell, 2010) .
The formal representation of evidence further makes it easier to identify gaps in evidence for a theory and determine what specific experiments would be needed to fill these gaps. For example, in our illustration here, there is no direct electrophysiological evidence supporting the involvement of the SNr in WMM. Instead, this is only implied by other knowledge about the circuit, but the overall hypothesis would be strengthened if experimental manipulation of SNr altered WMM following predictions from the framework.
Finally, the development of more formal multilevel models is important to embed individual experiments in a broader framework that can be appreciated by colleagues and funding agencies. It is possible for an individual study to focus on one component of a complex theory without its results having much bearing on the overall credibility of the theory, and further, results at one level may not be readily interpretable in the context of another level. By seeing how specific experimental results fit in the "big picture" of a broader theory, we can begin to evaluate how much a particular experiment will alter the credibility of the entire theory, by examining critical assumptions or testing key implications. We believe this approach may be crucial in RDoC and related initiatives, to help assure that definitions of concepts at one level are compatible with definitions of concepts at other levels or units of analysis. Consensus about high level phenotype concepts may be difficult to achieve, but a framework like that described here can help flag controversy, link competing definitions to the evidence on which these are based, and facilitate argumentation about which definitions are the best, using community input. If this is not done, we run the risk of replacing the current flawed diagnostic taxonomy with either dimensions or categories that may have little incremental validity with respect to their biological underpinnings. Developing multilevel models of the kinds described here, however, can help formalize existing schemata, including the current categorical taxonomy, and enable us to judge alternate-and we hope improved-models based on empirical evidence.
